Humanitarian Project Rules · 1 of 3

What makes a humanitarian project fundable

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In short

  • Projects requiring continued American sustainment are generally not approved.
  • A security force may be assisted only where civilians are the ultimate beneficiary.
  • Human rights vetting must be complete before any assistance is provided.
Published18 September 2026
Last reviewed18 September 2026
Sources current as of18 September 2026

1. The test every project has to pass

The defense department funds humanitarian work overseas out of a dedicated appropriation, and the money comes with a purpose written into statute. "All OHDACA-funded activities and projects must serve a humanitarian purpose, as required by 10 U.S.C. 2561" (SAMM C12.3.4.1).

That purpose is defined by who benefits. "the civilian populace must be the primary beneficiary of OHDACA-funded engagement" (SAMM C12.3.4.1), and the qualifying activities are described in human terms: "Activities that serve an essential human need such as reducing human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation fall within the scope of HA" (SAMM C12.3.4.1).

The exclusions are more revealing than the inclusions. Work primarily intended to assist reconstruction, stabilization, economic development, national security, law enforcement, prisons, recovery of human remains, vocational training, community centers, municipal libraries, environmental remediation, or social and athletic events is out of scope (SAMM C12.3.4.1). What the appropriation does pay for is covered in what OHDACA funds.

The paperwork has to make the case. "The OHDACA project submission must contain sufficient detail to clearly identify the intended beneficiary, scope of work, and objectives of the engagement" (SAMM C12.3.4.1).

2. Choosing where to work

Selection is supposed to follow need rather than opportunity. "CCMDs should select humanitarian activities based on an assessment of the greatest humanitarian need" (SAMM C12.3.4.2), while still meeting command priorities. The manual points commands towards countries that are underdeveloped relative to others in the region, where government capacity to deliver essential services is weak, or where populations are particularly vulnerable (SAMM C12.3.4.2).

Distribution within a country is constrained too. "OHDACA-funded projects must provide equitable access to all populations in need, regardless of ethnic, racial, sex, or religious considerations" (SAMM C12.3.4.3), and each submission confirms that the benefit reaches all segments of the population.

Durability is the other selection criterion. Projects should build the capacity of the partner government to deliver humanitarian services itself, through transferred skills, equipment, or built and renovated facilities (SAMM C12.3.4.4).

3. Who keeps it running afterwards

A project that cannot be maintained is treated as a failed project. Nominations must describe the sustainment plan, or state what would prevent the partner sustaining the capability (SAMM C12.3.4.5).

The consequence is stated plainly. "DSCA will generally not approve projects requiring USG sustainment of OHDACA-funded equipment or facilities" (SAMM C12.3.4.5). Equipment nobody local can keep working is equipment that should not be provided.

That is a design constraint with real consequences for what gets built. A simpler facility that a ministry can run beats a better one it cannot.

4. Helping a military to help civilians

The hardest question in this chapter is when defense money may help a partner’s armed forces. The default is to route assistance elsewhere: legal title to procured equipment goes to a civil government agency rather than a security force wherever possible, and construction supports a civil facility rather than a military one (SAMM C12.3.4.6).

The reason given is diversion risk. "Provision of HA to non-military organizations minimizes risk that the assistance might be diverted by the partner away from a humanitarian purpose" (SAMM C12.3.4.6).

Where a security force is assisted, four conditions stack up. Such activities "shall not benefit foreign security forces (to include partner militaries or paramilitary groups) unless the ultimate beneficiary of the activity is the civilian populace" (SAMM C12.3.4.6) and that force has an official role in delivering humanitarian services directly to the public. The defense department must be unable to achieve the same objective through civil authorities, and "the assisted security force must exclusively use the provided equipment or facility for humanitarian purposes" (SAMM C12.3.4.6).

Vetting is a precondition, not a formality. "Human rights vetting (HRV) must be completed of assisted security force units or individuals before the CCMD provides the proposed assistance" (SAMM C12.3.4.6). The equivalent screening for training is described in screening international military students.

5. Military hospitals, and a letter that is hard to get

Healthcare shows how narrow the exception is. "CCMDs shall prioritize building the capacity of partner Ministry of Health (MoH) and municipal/local civil government agencies to provide healthcare services over supporting security force or military healthcare facilities" (SAMM C12.3.4.6.1).

Supporting a military hospital is permitted only where two things hold. The facility must treat civilians on the same terms as military patients, and assistance to it must be the only feasible way of supporting the health ministry obligation in that area (SAMM C12.3.4.6.1). The example given is an area with no civilian government facility at all.

Building work is limited accordingly. Except for replacing a facility on the same site, "construction efforts in support of a security force or military healthcare facility will be limited to repair of existing facilities" (SAMM C12.3.4.6.1).

Two documents are required, and the manual is candid about the second. The embassy office validates factually that the facility treats everyone equally, and the health ministry must confirm in writing that the support enables it to reach civilians in an area lacking civilian facilities (SAMM C12.3.4.6.1.2). "Obtaining such a statement from the MoH may be challenging" (SAMM C12.3.4.6.1.2), and replacement construction of a military health facility should therefore be rare.

6. Who does the work, and who holds the contract

Contracting is a late consideration in the manual and an early one in practice. Planners are told to look first at capability already inside the department, including the coast guard, the national guard and reserve components, before going outside (SAMM C12.3.4.7).

Local sourcing is preferred where it works: "Whenever practical, goods and services should be procured from the local economy" (SAMM C12.3.4.7).

Above the smallest purchases, the rules are formal. "The preparation and oversight of any contract for services or for materiel purchased for an OHDACA-funded project (above the micro-purchase threshold) requires use of a warranted U.S. contracting officer" (SAMM C12.3.4.7), and the office is named before the project is even submitted: "Planners must identify the contracting office which will administer the contract prior to submission of any project nomination" (SAMM C12.3.4.7), with its costs in the estimate.

7. One project, one complete benefit

The last rule prevents a familiar workaround. "All OHDACA-funded projects must result in the partner receiving a total and complete benefit from the project" (SAMM C12.3.4.8), the example being that a construction project must produce a complete and usable facility with its full cost declared.

Breaking a project up to get under a limit is named and barred. "Project splitting is prohibited, regardless of the cost or size of the project" (SAMM C12.3.4.8), as is using this appropriation to top up another one.

How a project moves from concept to approval is described in how an OHDACA project is approved.

8. What a supplier can take from this

Two constraints shape the work these projects actually buy. Sustainment has to be local, so designs favor what a ministry can operate and maintain. And a project must deliver a complete benefit in one piece, so phased or partial scopes are not available as a way of fitting a budget.

The contracting rule is the practical one. The administering office is identified before the project is submitted and its costs sit in the estimate, which means the acquisition route is fixed early. Local procurement is preferred where it is practical, which favors providers already established in country.

Key terms

Humanitarian purposeThe statutory test. Civilians must be the primary beneficiary, and reconstruction or security work is excluded.
Equitable accessBenefit reaching all populations in need, without ethnic, racial, sex or religious distinction.
Human rights vettingScreening that must be complete before any assistance reaches a security force unit or individual.
Project splittingDividing an effort to get under a regulatory or fiscal limit. Prohibited at any size.

Every statement above links to the document behind it. The full source list for this piece is on the sources page.

This page describes public United States government programs for general information. It is not legal, regulatory or procurement advice, and it does not address the facts of any particular case.

How Sentfore supports this

Humanitarian work happens in the places where support on the ground is hardest to arrange. Sentfore works at the delivery end of defense programs in difficult environments, providing secure movement, protective security, facilities and life support. Requirements can be sent through the contact page.